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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
WENDELL W. MOTTER and 
BETTY F. MOTTER, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
RUSSELL R. BATEMAN and 
MYRNA GAYE BATEMAN, 
his wife, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
10552 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action by plaintiffs to recover the 
balance due on a written contract for the sale of 
a business and rental of a building and counter-
action by defendants for recision of the contract 
and return of the monies paid thereon. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury. From a verdict 
and judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, defendants 
appeal. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants seek a reversal of the judgment 
and a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On August 28, 1961 plaintiffs agreed to sell 
and defendants agreed to purchase a business loc-
ated in St. George, Utah for the sum of $25,000.00 
and to rent from the plaintiffs the premises housing 
the business for a period of five years at a monthly 
rental of $200.00. Defendants executed and deliver-
ed to plaintiffs a promissory note in the sum of 
$20,000.00 payable at the rate of $200.00 per month, 
beginning September 1, 1961 with interest on the 
unpaid balance at the rate of 7% per year and 
gave a mortgage on nine acres of land owned by 
defendants to the plaintiffs to secure the payment 
of the promissory note. 
Defendants took possession of the business on 
September 1, 1961 and continued in possession until 
around January 27, 1962. On January 27, 1962 
defendants sent a Notice of Recision to plaintiffs 
claiming that plaintiffs had made misrepresenta-
tions about the business which had induced the de-
fendants to enter into the contract. 
Defendants had paid to plaintiffs the sum of 
$5,800.00 on the contract of purchase and $800.00 
on the rent prior to the time defendants left the 
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premises. Plaintiffs filed the present action on De-
cember 27, 1962 to recover the amount of $7,104.43 
on the contract of sale; $2,400.00 as unpaid rent 
and $2,500.00 as attorney's fees. On February 7, 
1964 defendants filed an answer to plaintiff's com-
plaint and counterclaimed for a recision of the 
contract and return of $7,056.75 paid to plaintiffs. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GIVING THE 
FOLLOWING INSTRUCTION NO. 7 "IN DETERMIN-
ING WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS MISREPRE-
SENTATION IN THIS CASE YOU MAY AND SHOULD 
CONSIDER WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS ANY 
FALSE OR MISLEADING STATEMENTS MADE BY 
THE PLAINTIFF WENDELL MOTTER TO THE DE-
FENDANTS WITH REGARD TO T HE C 0 S T OR 
VALUE OF THE INVENTORY, THE REASON FOR 
SELLING THE BUSINESS, THE GROSS VOLUME OF 
THE BUSINESS OR THE NET PROFIT WHICH THE 
BUSINESS WAS PRODUCING OR HAD PRODUCED. 
YOU MAY AND SHOULD CONSIDER WHETHER IN 
FACT SUCH STATEMENT OR STATEMENTS WERE 
KNOWN TO THE SAID PLAINTIFF WENDELL MOT-
TER TO BE FALSE AND WHETHER THEY WERE 
MADE WITH INTENT THAT THE DEFENDANT 
SHOULD RELY THEREON. YOU MAY AND SHOULD 
CONSIDER ALSO AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THE 
DEFENDANTS DID IN FACT RELY UPON SUCH 
STATEMENTS IF THEY WERE FALSE, OR DID MAKE 
A SEPARATE AND SPECIAL INVESTIGATION OF 
THE MATTER SO AS TO RELY ON OTHER SOURCES 
AS DISCLOSED AND UNCOVERED BY SUCH SEP-
ARATE INVESTIGATION. YOU MAY AND SHOULD 
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CONSIDER WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS IN FACT 
ANY DISPARITY WITH RESPECT TO THE INTELLI. 
GENCE AND EXPERIENCE OF THE PARTIES IN 
THIS MATTER, IF ANY YOU FIND, WHICH WOULD 
IN FACT MAKE THE DEFENDANTS MORE SUS-
CEPTIBLE TO FRAUD THAN THE ORDINARY PRU-
DENT PERSON," BECAUSE IT DOES NOT EXPLAIN 
WHAT EFFECT SUCH DISP ARI'TY IN EXPERIENCE 
AND INTELLIGENCE BETWEEN THE PARTIES 
WOULD MAKE NOR WHAT C 0 N S I D E R A TI 0 N 
SHOULD BE GIVEN BY THE JURORS IF IT FOUND 
SUCH A DISPARITY THAT WOULD IN FACT MAKE 
THE DEFENDANTS MORE SUSCEPTIBLE TO FRAUD 
THAN THE ORDINARY PRUDENT PERSON. 
Whether or not the jury found such a disparity 
with respect to intelligence and experience that made 
the defendants more susceptible to fraud than the 
ordinary prudent person would be a determining 
factor in considering the defendant's right to rely 
on the representations of plaintifs or whether the 
defendants had a duty to investigate the truthful-
ness of plaintiff's statements. 
In Spiess v. Brandt, (Minn.) 41 NW2d 561, 27 
ALR 2d 1 the court stated: 
"Where there is great disparity between 
the parties, and inexperienced and credulous 
vendee has a legal right to rescind a contract 
of purchase from the experienced vendors, 
who, for the purpose of inducing a sale, r~p­
resent that their experience in the operation 
of the business being sold resulted in definite 
and substantial profits, where such rep~e­
sentations are relied upon and actually m-
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duce the sale and are found to be false. 23 Am 
Jur 841, Fraud and Deceit; 26 CJ pp 1069, 
1075; Gaetke v. Ebarr Co. 195 Minn 393 263 
NW 448; Dunnell's Dig 3820, 3823, 3828, 
note 65, 3833; 23 Am Jur, Fraud and Deceit 
p 850, 76; p 857 80; annotation in 50 ALR 
436; Gable v. Niles Holding Co. 209 Minn 
445, 296 NW 525. 
* * * Although the element of disparity 
in business experience is not of itself a suffi-
cient ground for relief, nevertheless, the law 
does not ignore such disparity, especially 
where, as here, the inexperience of youth is 
coupled with an added factor of special trust 
and confidence growing out of a reasonable 
assumption by plaintiffs that a genuine and 
close friendship existed between them and de-
fendants. See Gable v. Niles Holding Co. 209 
Minn 445, 296 NW 525. On various occasions 
when plaintiffs visited the resort to enjoy the 
out of doors, defendants had exhibited many 
manifestations of friendship. In youth, every 
manifestation of friendship seems genuine 
and deserving of special trust and confidence. 
Disparity may under some circumstances be 
a factor of considerable importance when we 
keep in mind that the question is not whether 
the representation would deceive the average 
man. In recision actions for fraud, the ques-
tion is whether the representations were of 
such a character and were made under such 
circumstances that they were reasonably cal-
culated to deceive, not the average man, but 
a person of the capacity and experience ?f. the 
particular individual who was the rec1p1ent 
of the representations. Kempf v. Ranger, 182 
Minn 64, 155 NW 1059. 
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* * * In cases involving false representations 
as to rents, profits, or income, it has been held 
that the question whether there is actionable 
fraud is determined with respect to the in-
telligence and experience of the victim of the 
fraud rather than by what the effect would 
have been on the average person. (Cases Cited 
including De Frees v. Carr ( 1893) 8 Utah 
488, 33 p 217) 
In the present case the defendant Russell Bate-
man had known the plaintiff Wendell Motter since 
1950 or a period of eleven years prior to the trans-
action. (T 21, L 24 to T 22, L 30) Plaintiff Motter 
had been in the electronic business, off and on, in 
one form and another, probably 15 years (Depo. of 
Wendell Motter, page 2, line 30) had resided in 
St. George 30 or 25 years ( T 24, L 11) and had 
fixed things for people all his life. ( T 25, L 1). De-
fendant Russell Bateman had not had any previous 
business experience. ( T 7, L 20-25). 
In addition to this disparity between the par-
ties as to business there existed a friendly relation-
ship between the parties resulting from plaintiff's 
having done a favor to defendant as early as 1950 
when plaintiff made possible a telephone-radio con-
versation between defendant Russell Bateman, then 
in Alaska, and his parents, then in St. George. (T 
22, L 11 to 17) In addition to this friendly rela-
tionship defendant Motter was a very good friend 
of defendant's brother. ( T 23, L 4 - 6) 
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The court's failure to explain the effect of such 
a disparity between the parties should also be con-
sidered in connection with the court's explanation 
of Special Interrogatory No. 5 when it said, "So 
you will fully understand it, if you find that Mr. 
Motter willfully with intention that the defendants 
rely on his statements did in fact make false and 
fraudulent statements to the defendant and they 
did in fact rely on them without an opportunity to 
check them or without any reasonable opportunity 
to check them, why, then, the determination of the 
Court would be for the defendants." 
With this statement given to the jurors after 
they had requested an explanation of the effect of 
their answer to Question No. 5 the jury could not 
find for the defendants if it believed the defendants 
had an opportunity to check the statements of the 
plaintiff or without any reasonable opportunity 
to check them. 
Even if the defendants had an opportunity to 
check the statements of plaintiff, there was no 
obligation to do so and the failure to avail them-
selves of such an opportunity, if it existed, would 
not have affected their right to recision of the 
contract. The Court said in DeFrees v. Carr (ibid) : 
* * * Counsel for defendants contend that the 
plaintiff had the opportunity to examine the 
books of the company to ascertain its cond~­
tion, and satisfy himself as to its responsi-
bility, before the trade was made; but, even 
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if this were the case, it would not license the 
defendants to lull the plaintiff into a state 
of security by false but apparently reliable 
statements of facts, such as are complained 
of in this case. The defendant George W. Carr 
was manager of the company, and its condi-
tion and financial responsibility will be pre-
sumed to have been within his knowledge. 
He cannot escape from the effects of his state-
ments by saying that the plaintiff could have 
ascertained its true condition. Where one 
party to a contract misrepresents a material 
fact, which operates as a surprise and as an 
inducement to the other party, relief will be 
granted. * * * ." 
It should be noted that the jury was divided on 
the effect of their answer to Question No. 5 which 
was to be answered in the event they answered 
Question No. 3 in the affirmative. 
Question No. 3 of the Verdict and Answers to 
Special Interrogatories was: 
"If your answer to question No. 2 is 
"Yes", then - Did the plaintiff Wendell W. 
Motter, prior to the execution of said docu-
ments by the defendants, willfully make any 
false representations to the defendants of and 
concerning the said business, with intention 
that the defendants would rely thereon?" 
ANSWER: ····----------------" 
Question No. 5 was : 
"If your answer to question No. 3 is 
"Yes", then - Did the defendants have any 
reasonable opportunity to ascertain the truth 
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of and concerning the said business and with 
regard to the said representations, if any, of 
the plaintiff with regard thereto, prior to 
their executing the said documents?" 
ANSWER: --------------------·" 
Unless the jury had intended to answer Ques-
tion No. 3 "Yes" there was no need to concern it-
self with answering Question No. 5. The Court's 
failure to explain the legal effect of the disparity 
which the jury was instructed to consider in Instruc-
tion No. 7, together with the Court's misstatement 
of the law applicable in this case to the effect that 
if defendants had an opportunity or any reasonable 
opportunity to check the statements of plaintiff that 
the determination of the court would be for the 
plaintiffs, clearly prejudiced the jury and literally 
amounted to an instruction to hold for the plain-
tiffs, inasmuch as there was never a doubt expressed 
during the trial as to whether or not the defendant 
had some opportunity to investigate the statements 
made by the plaintiff Wendell W. Motter. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S EXPLANATION AND COM-
MENTS TO THE JURY UPON THE EFFECT OF THE 
JURY'S ANSWER TO QUESTION NO. 5 WAS PRE-
JUDICIAL ERROR AND CONTRARY TO THE LAW 
APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE, AND WAS CONTRARY 
TO PREVIOUS INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN TO THE JURY. 
After deliberating from 5 :40 p.m. until 9 :55 
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p.m. the jury requested the court's explanation on 
Question No. 5. The Court stated: 
"Well, the Sheriff has handed me this 
question which you have written out; and I 
quote, "We are divided on Question Number 
5. Please explain what effect this will have on 
the fallowing questions in regard to the ver-
dict." Is that the question that is bothering 
you people? 
After Juror Judd (jury foreman) answered, 
"Yes", the Court continued: 
"I have a copy of the form of verdict in 
answer to special interrogatories, and Ques-
tion Number 5 is this: '''If your answer to 
Question Number 2 is yes," and Question 
Number 2 refers to the question, "Did the 
defendant execute the documents with knowl-
edge of what they were doing and with knowl-
edge of the contents of the documents?" I 
assume that you have answered that question 
because you then are concerned about Ques-
tion Number 3. If your answer to Question 
Number 2 is yes, "then, did plaintiff, Wen-
dell W. Motter, prior to the execution of the 
said documents by the defendants," that 
would be before the defendants signed and 
executed the documents, "did Mr. Motter will-
fully, that is, intentionally and with knowl-
edge -" you will recall the instructions of 
what willfully meant and that is, not acci-
dentally and unintentionally, make any false 
representations to the defendants concerning 
the business and with the intention that the 
defendants would rely thereon. Now, I think 
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you can find either yes or no, he did make 
false statements or he did not. Maybe I am 
missing the point of your question. If you 
find that he did, why, then, you would answer 
the next question : "Did they in fact rely on 
his representation." And Number 5: "If you 
find that they did rely on it, did they have 
reasonable opportunity to ascertain the truth 
of and concerning the business with regard 
to these representations prior to executing 
the documents." If your answer to that is 
yes, then, you are down to Number 6, "Did 
the defendants in executing the documents 
rely on their own observation and investiga-
tions of and concerning the business and the 
plaintiff's statements with regard thereto 
rather than merely on the representations of 
plaintiffs." You can answer that yes or no. 
Then, of course, Number 7 and Number 8 
would be a judgment, would be entered de-
pending on the answer to your previous ques-
tions; and the Court would use either Num-
ber 7 or Number 8 depending on how you 
answered the previous questions. So you will 
fully understand it, if you find that Mr. Mot-
ter willfully with intention that the defend-
ants rely on his statements did in fact make 
false and fraudulent statements to the de-
fendant and they did in fact rely on them 
without an opportunity to check them or with-
out any reasonable opportunity to check them, 
why, then, the determination of the Court 
would be for the defendants. 
If, on the other hand, Mr. Motter didn't 
make any false statements, or even if he did, 
if he didn't make them knowingly or will-
fully without knowledge of them and made 
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statements that were in fact improper or false 
but ~ithout his knowing they were false or 
even 1f he knew they were false yet he didn't 
make them with the intentions that those 
people should rely on them, or if they relied 
on something else, their own investigation 
why, then, these people had a contract· and 
they should be bound to it." ' 
It is obvious that Questions 4, 5 and 6 were to 
be answered only if the answer to No. 3 was "Yes." 
That is, the jury must find that plaintiff Wendell 
W. Motter, prior to the execution of said documents 
by the Defendants, willfully made some false rep-
resentations to the defendants of and concerning 
the said business, with intent that the defendants 
would rely thereon, before they were to answer 
with respect to defendant's actual reliance thereon 
(Question No. 4) or whether defendants had any 
reasonable opportunity to check the statements of 
the plain tiff (Question No. 5) or whether the de-
fendants relied on their own observations and in-
vestigations rather than merely on the representa-
tions of the plaintiffs. (Question No. 6) 
With respect to the Questions to be answered 
and the verdict the jury was instructed by the court 
as follows: (Pleadings 51) 
Instead of finding generally in favor of 
the plaintiff or the defendant, you are dire~t­
ed to answer the questions which are submit-
ted to you and thereby determi~e the facts 
at issue in this case. The Court will apply the 
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law to the facts and enter judgment in ac-
cordance therewith. * * *. 
The form of the Verdict and Answers to Spe-
cial Interrogatories did not provide for the jury to 
make a determination as to the validity or invali-
dity of the contract between the parties nor did 
it provide for a general verdict in favor of either 
party. 
Question 7 was : 
Assuming the documents executed by and 
between the parties to be in full force and 
effect, what amount exclusive of interest is 
due and owing from the defendants to the 
plaintiffs, 
(a) For the sales of the business? 
$--- ---- -------------
( b) For the rental of the buildings? 
$----- ---------------
Question 8 was: 
Assuming the documents executed by and 
between the parties to be null and void, what 
amount exclusive of interest is due and ow-
ing from the plaintiffs to the defendants? 
ANSWER: $------------------------· 
The jury answered No. 7 but ignored No. 8. 
The Court's statement at the 9 :55 p.m. session to 
the jury that its determination would be for the 
defendants if the jury found that Motter willfully 
with intention that the defendants rely on his state-
ments did in fact make false and fraudulent state-
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ments to the defendant and they did in fact rely on 
them without an opportunity to check them or with-
out any reasonable opportunity to check them con-
stituted an error which was prejudicial to the de-
fendants. Except for the court's statement and ex-
planation the jury could have answered all of the 
applicable Questions (including both Questions 7 
and 8) and the facts having then been determined 
the Court could have applied the law and entered 
judgment accordingly. As Question 5 was to be 
answered only if Question Number 3 was answered 
"Yes" the fact that the jury was divided on Ques-
tion Number 5 and wanted to know what legal ef-
fect it would have on the following questions and the 
verdict makes it obvious that prior to the Court's 
explanation the jury's answer to Question No. 5 
was "Yes." After the Court's explanation the jury 
again retired to continue their deliberations and 
within ten minutes had returned to the courtroom 
with Question Number 3 answered, "No", and Ques-
tions 4, 5, 6 and 8 disregarded. Clearly the court's 
comments were prejudicial to the defendants and 
affected the outcome of this case. 
By way of further explanation to the jury in 
answer to their query regarding Question Number 
5, the Court stated: 
If on the other hand, Mr. Motter didn't 
make ~ny false statements, ~r even if ~e did, 
if he didn't make them knowingly or willfully 
without full knowledge of them and made 
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staten~ents th3:t were in fact improper or false 
but ":ithout his knowing they were false or 
even if he knew they were false yet he didn't 
make them with the intentions that those 
people should rely on them, or if they didn't 
actuallr rely on them, that they relied on 
somethmg else, their own investigation, why, 
then, these people had a contract· and they 
should be bound to it." ' 
This statement was not only confusing but was 
an incorrect statement of the law applicable in this 
case and the comment to the effect that if the de-
fendants didn't actually rely on the false statements 
of the plaintiff, but relied on something else, their 
own investigation, then, they had a contract and 
should be bound by it was prejudicial to defendants 
side of the case. 
Prior to the 9 :55 p.m. session the jury could have 
found that even if defendants had a reasonable op-
portunity to investigate the truthfulness of plain-
tiff's statements they may have been thwarted in 
so doing and still been entitled to recover. By In-
struction No. 3 and No. 4 the Court explained that 
before the plaintiffs would be precluded from re-
covery the jury would have to find that the defend-
ants had no reasonable opportunity to determine the 
truthfulness or falsity of the alleged misrepresenta-
tions, or although the defendants had a reasonable 
opportunity to determine the truth or falsity of the 
alleged misrepresentations the defendants were 
thwarted by actions or devices of the plaintiffs so 
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as to prevent such discovery. (Instructions 3 and 4) 
During the 9 :55 p.m. session the Court failed tu 
mention that even if the defendants had an oppor-
tunity to ascertain the truth that they may have been 
thwarted in their efforts to do so and if such were 
the case that they still could have been entitled to 
recovery. 
Defendant Russell Bateman testified: ( T 135, 
L 22 - 30) 
"The fact it was actually suggested by 
Wendell that I go over and look at the books 
but he had mentioned it probably wouldn't re~ 
veal too much to me, not to take too much in-
terest; and, then, he would go on to say the 
real value, as you can see, "what I am get-
ting out of this, I have got this store free and 
clear and got my home in Pine Valley and 
I have got my home here in town free and 
clear." He said those are the thing you really 
need to look at." 
In answer to the question, "Now, what did 
he (Motter) say with respect to your examining all 
of the books that Dexter Snow had?", Bateman 
testified: 
He mentioned that the books were a neces-
sary evil and you had to supply so much in-
formation for tax purposes and so forth; ~ut 
he said that the stock and the merchandise 
and the income he had far exceeded what was 
shown on the books." 
From such testimony the jury could easily have 
found that although the defendants had an oppor-
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tunity to check the records that they were thwarted 
or discouraged in their efforts to do so and if that 
were the case that their failure to do so would not 
prevent them from recovery. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
GIVE DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 
8- "A PURCHASER MAY BE EXCUSED FROM MAK-
ING A THOROUGH INSPECTION OR INVESTIGA-
TION WHEN HE BELIEVES AND RELIES ON THE 
VENDOR'S STATEMENTS. A VENDOR WHO MAKES 
FALSE STATEMENTS INDUCING ANOTHER TO 
BUY PROPERTY WILL NOT BE ALLOWED TO CON-
TEND THAT BY ORDINARY DILIGENCE AND IN-
QUIRY, THE PURCHASER COULD HAVE LEARNED 
THE TRUTH. 
THE FACT THAT THE PURCHASER WAS WITH-
OUT KNOWLEDGE OF THE TRUTH CONCERNING 
THE MATTER ABOUT WHICH THE REPRESENTA-
TION WAS MADE JUSTIFIES HIS BELIEF IN AND 
RELIANCE ON IT." 
The proposed instruction was necessary to pro-
perly inform the jury of the law with respect to the 
defendant's right to rely on the statements made by 
plaintiff with respect to the business and unless the 
jury were properly informed on the law they could 
not render a correct verdict. 
It is stated in 23 American Jurisprudence 
Fraud & Deceit § 158, pp 965-966. 
Referring a representee to the sources _of 
the speaker's information doe~ n?t. necessarily 
relieve the representor from habih~y f?r false 
statements, since the representee s right to 
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r~ly on such statement~ withou~ an investiga. 
~ion of the s01.~rces of information mentioned 
is not necessarily destroyed by such reference 
* * * ) 
. J\ representor. cannot escape liability for 
his m1sre:presei:tation by advising the repre-
sentee to investigate and to satisfy himself as 
to the property before acquiring it. (Annota-
tion 61 A.L.R. 515) 
* * * 
It is well settled that a representee has a 
right to rely upon representations where a 
confidential relationship exists between the 
parties. In such cases a high degree of frank-
ness and fair dealing is required, and the rep-
resentee cannot be charged with lack of dili-
gence in failing to make an independent in-
vestigation, either at the time or afterward. 
Similarly, where, by reason of the represent-
or's superior knowledge or experience with 
respect to the thing dealt with or because of 
relations of friendship or trust existing be-
tween the parties, the represen tee expressly 
relies upon the honesty of the representor and 
the latter's representations as to the subject 
matter, without attempting to ascertain the 
truth of the representations, the representor 
is bound to act honorably and deal fairly with 
the representee and is generally held liable 
for fraud or misrepresentations, although the 
representee might have ascertained the facts 
by an independent investigation. * * *. 
The fact that the party to whom repre-
sentations are made may have discovered the 
truth by investigation is immaterial w~ere .he 
is fraudulently induced to forego makmg m-
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quiries or investigations in whole or in part 
which he otherwise wo~ld make where th~ 
representations are of such a cha~acter or are 
made. in sue~ ~ way as t~ disarm his vigilance, 
lull his susp1c10ns, and mduce him to refrain 
from making such inquiries or examina-
tions. * * *. 
* * * 
Unusual difficulty in examining, or in 
securing information concerning, the proper-
ty commercially dealt with has in various 
situations been held to warrant justification 
in reliance upon representations as to such 
property without an investigation. The prin-
ciple has been applied to transactions involv-
ing such personalty as a stock of goods or 
other property consisting of numerous items. 
(Annotation 61 A.L.R. 528 et seq) 
Thus, the purchaser of a stock of mer-
chandise has been held to have the right to 
rely upon the seller's fraudulent misrepre-
sentations of these matters, although, he could 
have examined the whole stock and discovered 
the falsity of the representations. * * * 
POINT IV. 
THE JURY VERDICT IS CONTRARY TO LAW 
AND TO THE EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONY PRO-
DUCED AT THE TRIAL. 
The jury was not requested to render a general 
verdict but rather to answer the questions sub-
mitted by the Court and determine the facts at 
issue in the case. (First page of Instructions to 
the Jury or page 51 of the Pleadings) Instead of 
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answering all of the questions applicable the jury 
rendered what amounted to a general verdict and 
ignored Question No. 8. From the form of the Ver-
dict and Answers to Special Interrogatories it is 
difficult to determine how the jury's answer to 
Question No. 7 became the general verdict and the 
answers to the parts of that question became the 
amount of the judgment. Question No. 7 was: 
"Assuming the documents executed by 
and between the parties to be in full force and 
effect, what amount exclusive of interest is 
due and owing from the defendants to the 
plaintiffs. 
(a) For the sale of the business? 
$. -- ---- -------------
( b) For the rental of the building? 
$--------------------" 
The jury's answer for part (a) was: $7,104.43 
and for part (b) was $2,400.00, and Judgment on 
Verdict for said amounts was entered accordingly. 
The Question was based upon an assumption and the 
answer of the jury was to assist the Court by deter-
mining the facts. The Court would apply the law 
thereto and render a judgment thereon. 
Question No. 8 was: 
Assuming the documents executed by and 
between the parties to be null and void, what 
amount exclusive of interest is due and ow-
ing from the plaintiffs to the defendants? 
ANSWER: $--------------------·" 
This question was not answered by the jury. 
Inasmuch as it was based upon an assumption, as 
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was No. 7, it should have been answered by the jury 
and the Court should have rendered the general ver-
dict either for the plaintiffs or the defendants. 
After the jury had submitted its answers to 
the special interrogatories and had been dismissed 
defendant's attorney moved the Court to set aside 
the verdict of the jury and grant a judgment of 
no cause of action as against the plaintiffs notwith-
standing the verdict and the answers to the special 
interrogatories rendered by the jury. The motion 
\vas taken under advisement and as yet has not been 
ruled upon. (T 180 and T 181) 
That the Judgment on Verdict is contrary to 
the law applicable in this case is the fact that it 
would constitute unjust enrichment to the plaintiffs 
and a harsh penalty to the defendants, if allowed to 
stand. As pointed out to the trial judge when the 
motion was made for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict the defendants had already paid to the plain-
tiffs the sum of more than $7,000 for a period of 
five months possession of the property. Exhibit D-4 
shows total payments from defendants to plaintiffs 
of $7,056. 75. Defendant Russell Bateman testified 
that he had invested approximately $14,000.00 in 
the business including the $7,056 he paid the plain-
tiffs. (T 154, L 9-12) Defendants made improve-
ments to the building which plaintiff Wendell Mot-
ter stated were good except for the timing. (T 69, 
L 6-30). Defendants payment to plaintiffs of 
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$7,056.75 and the improvements to plaintiff's build-
ing constitute sufficient penalty to have to pay for 
a first business venture. An additional judgment of 
$11,796.73 or for any amount against the defend-
ants would constitute a harsh and cruel punishment 
and would not only amount to an unjust forfeiture 
but would result in an unjust enrichment of the 
plaintiffs. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants submit that from the foregoing it 
is evident that the lower court erred in failing to 
correctly instruct the jury on the law applicable 
to the case; in not requiring the jury to follow the 
court's instructions; in failing to correctly explain 
Question No. 5 at the 9 :55 P.M. session; in allow-
ing the Jury's answer to Question No. 7 to consti-
tute a general verdict; in not rendering a general 
verdict itself; in requiring the jury to assume the 
validity of the con tract between the parties and in 
not ruling upon defendant's motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict and answers to special 
interrogatories by the jury. 
The verdict judgment should be set aside and 
the cause remanded for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MAXWELL BENLEY 
412 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Appellants 
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